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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence offenses are difficult to prosecute because the bat-
terer's actions often make the victim unavailable to testify. Since the mid-
1990s, prosecutors have pursued "victimless" prosecutions' to combat the
problem.2 Victimless prosecutions seek to introduce reliable evidence with-
out the victim's in-court testimony, often to maintain the victim's safety or
to avoid re-victimizing the victim.3 The victimless prosecution is based
largely on the admission of hearsay statements that a victim makes to 911
operators, police officers, doctors, nurses, paramedics, and social workers.4
Victimless prosecution has been a highly successful tool in society's efforts
to eradicate domestic violence and it is made possible by using the unavail-
able victim's admissible hearsay statements. In its most recent term, the
United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington5 and held
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Montana University School of Law; B.A. in History, Brown Uni-
versity, 1988; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis, 1993. 1 am indebted to Kristin King-Ries and
Melissa Hartigan for their insightful comments on earlier drafts and to Judy Wang, Assistant Missoula
City Attorney, for her invaluable assistance and profound commitment to domestic violence victims.
Also, thanks are due to Rebecca Rutz, who provided outstanding research assistance.
1. "Victimless" prosecution describes a prosecution in which the domestic violence victim never
testifies in the prosecution's case. The term is misleading in that there is a victim to the offense; she
simply does not physically appear in court, so the prosecution is "victimless." Some prosecutors refer to
victimless prosecutions as "evidence-based" in an effort to recognize that an actual person has been
victimized and that prosecution is appropriate because it is supported by the evidence. The term "evi-
dence-based" prosecution can be criticized as meaningless, since all prosecutions must by necessity be
based on evidence. This article will use "victimless" rather than "evidence-based" to highlight the central
issue in Crawford surrounding unavailable victims.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 22-63.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-42.
4. Generally, these statements fall into three categories: excited utterances, FED. R. EVID. 803(2),
present sense impressions, id. 803(3), and statements to medical personnel, id. 803(4). See infra text
accompanying notes 38-55. Prior to Crawford, the above hearsay statements were potentially admissible
even when the domestic violence victim did not testify. See infra text accompanying notes 43-73.
5. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
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that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars admission of
certain hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses.6 With its decision in
Crawford, the Supreme Court placed the future of victimless domestic vio-
lence prosecutions in doubt.7
This article will explore the Crawford decision in the context of vic-
timless prosecutions. Part II will discuss current trends in victimless domes-
tic violence prosecution and the power and control dynamics of domestic
violence relationships, including how these dynamics relate to, and create
the need for, victimless prosecutions. Part III will discuss the Crawford de-
cision. Part IV will explore possible interpretations of Crawford within the
context of victimless domestic violence prosecutions. Part V will explain
why courts should interpret Crawford in a way that allows prosecutors to
continue to prosecute batterers without a participating victim.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE VICTIMLESS PROSECUTION
Near midnight, Stephanie dials 911. She reports to the 911 operator
that her husband, Frank, punched her in the face, dragged her by the hair,
and threw her down the stairs. Stephanie is crying andscreaming. A t times,
her speech is unintelligible. The operator asks her where Frank is and
whether he has any knives or guns. Stephanie is not sure; she thinks he has
left the apartment. In response to questions, Stephanie describes Frank as
six feet tall with black hair and a medium build. She gives the operator
Frank's last name and his birth date. Stephanie begs the operator to tell the
officers to hurry. She says that Frank told her that he would kill her if she
called the police. As the operator assures Stephanie that the police are on
the way, Stephanie screams that Frank has a knife. Sounds of a scuffle are
heard; Stephanie screams, "You cut me. You cut me."
Officer Johnson is the first to arrive. He finds Stephanie lying in afe-
tal position on a bed. He sees that she is bleeding from a severe laceration
on her forearm. Stephanie, shaking and crying, tells Officer Johnson that
Frank tried to kill her. Officer Johnson secures the scene and locates a
bloody knife on the kitchen counter. Frank is not there. Officer Johnson
photographs the cut on Stephanie's arm and the blood on her sheets. He
places the knife and several photographs of Stephanie and Frank into evi-
dence.
6. Id. at 1370.
7. Id. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring):
I believe that the Court's adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is not
backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule long-established precedent. Its deci-
sion casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state courts,
and is by no means necessary to decide the present case.
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Stephanie is transported to the hospital emergency room. There, she
tells Doctor Jones that Frank cut her and threw her down the stairs. Dr.
Jones sutures the laceration on Stephanie's arm and orders blood tests.
Robin, a hospital social worker, visits Stephanie. Stephanie tells Robin
that Frank is her husband of seven years and that he regularly beats her
and forces her to have sexual intercourse. Frank suspected that she was
seeing another man and confronted her. Stephanie reports that Frank did
not believe her denials and started to beat her. According to Stephanie,
Frank asserted that he would never go back to jail with her alive.
Several days later, Detective Smith meets with Stephanie and takes
additional photographs of Stephanie's injuries. These photographs docu-
ment severe bruising to Stephanie's back, legs, and face. Detective Smith
also discovers that Frank had been convicted of an assault against Stepha-
nie. In the prior case, Stephanie called 911 and was treated by a doctor for
broken bones in her wrist and index finger. Stephanie testified at the earlier
trial, and Frank was sentenced to six months in jail with credit for time
served
Prior to Frank's current trial, Stephanie informs the prosecution that
she will not testify. Stephanie indicates that Frank threatened to kill her if
she sent him back to jail. She also states that Frank was the sole provider
for her household, so she cannot afford to have him in jail. The prosecution
is unable to subpoena Stephanie or secure her presence for an interview
with the defense. 8
A. Domestic Violence Dynamics and Criminal Prosecutions
Millions of American women are the victims of domestic violence
each year; in fact, domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to
women. 9 Nearly half of all American women will experience a violent do-
mestic relationship in their lifetimes. 1
8. The story of Stephanie is a construct, drawn from my experience prosecuting domestic violence
cases at the King County Prosecutor's Office in Seattle, Washington. Although a construct, Stephanie's
story reflects a typical domestic violence case. See, e.g., People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906 (Mich.
1998); Humphrey v. State, No. A-6543, 1999 WL 46541, at *I (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999).
9. Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, in NANCY K.D. LEMON,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 11, 15 (2001) (nearly four million American women are victims of domestic
violence each year); Benjamin Z. Rice, A Voice from People v. Simpson: Reconsidering the Propensity
Rule in Spousal Homicide Cases, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (1996) ("Violence is now the lead-
ing cause of injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years.") (citing Antonio C. Novello, From the Sur-
geon General, U.S. Public Health Service: A Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132,
3132 (1992)).
10. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991).
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The battering relationship is not about conflict between two people;
rather, it is about one person exercising power and control over the other. '
Battering is a pattern of verbal and physical abuse, but the batterer's behav-
ior can take many forms.' 2 Common manifestations of that behavior include
imposing economic or financial restrictions, enforcing physical and emo-
tional isolation, repeatedly invading the victim's privacy, supervising the
victim's behavior, terminating support from family or friends, threatening
violence toward the victim, threatening suicide, getting the victim addicted
to drugs or alcohol, and physically or sexually assaulting the victim.' 3 The
purpose of the abusive behavior is to subjugate the victim and establish the
batterer's superiority.' 4
Historically, the domestic violence victim's refusal to testify precluded
prosecution. 15 Jurisdictions relied exclusively on the victim to determine
whether to proceed with a domestic violence prosecution. 16 While the
1I. Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by
and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 793 (1996).
Raeder explains as follows:
Most commentators appear to agree that coercion, control, and domination are at the heart of
domestic violence. While violence is instrumental in maintaining control, it is not the actual
goal. Thus, emotional and financial coercion, as well as destruction of property, all mix to-
gether with physical battering to maintain the male's domination of his mate.
Id. See also Daniel Jay Sonkin & William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in the Prosecution
of Male Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE 218, 222-223 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987); Anne L. Ganley, Domestic Violence:
The What, Why and Who, as Relevant to Criminal and Civil Court Domestic Violence Cases, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES 2-5 to 2-6 (Helen Halpert et. al. eds., 1997).
12. Ganley, supra note I1, at 2-5 to 2-6; Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage: Until Death Do Us
Part, in VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS, CAUSES AND EFFECTS 50,52 (Albert P.
Cardarelli ed., 1977).
13. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1206 (1993). See also Evan Stark, Re-
Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV.
973, 975, 983 (1995).
14. NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO
ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 35, 43, 61, 148 (1998).
15. See Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Battering Partners: Some Innova-
tions in the Lav of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 89,90 n.6 (1997) (noting that the Texas legislature
has said that "[v]ictims of domestic violence are often the only witnesses to the violence. Because of
this, when a victim chooses not to testify in a criminal proceeding, he or she may unintentionally weaken
the case against the perpetrator, and the case may be dismissed due to lack of evidence."); see also David
M. Gersten, General Practice: Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, FLA. B.J., July/August 1998, at
65 (explaining that the refusal of a domestic violence victim to testify destroys the prosecution's case if
there is no tangible evidence); cf Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic
Violence Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 73 (1998)
("[H]istorically, law enforcement officials have used the lack of victim cooperation as an excuse for their
lax response to domestic violence.").
16. See Morley H. Swingle, et al., Unhappy Families: Prosecuting and Defending Domestic Vio-
lence Cases, 58 J. Mo. B. 220, 220 (2002) ("In the past, most prosecutors routinely dismissed domestic
assault cases upon the victim's request. Some jurisdictions still do.").
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charging decision has always remained with the State, the perception that
the victim presses charges reflected reality. 7 Many jurisdictions required
the domestic violence victim to swear out a complaint after the incident,
assuring the prosecution that the victim was willing to participate. 18 When
the victim refused to appear for trial, prosecutors' offices traditionally dis-
missed the case.' 9 This remains the status quo in a surprising number ofju-
risdictions in America. 20
In any type of criminal case, a victim's refusal to participate in the trial
creates credibility concerns and undermines the integrity of the prosecution.
At a minimum, these situations require the prosecution to reassess the valid-
ity of the case and the decision to proceed. In an effort to achieve a just re-
sult and to decide whether to go forward with the prosecution, the prosecu-
tor will consider the need for the victim's testimony, the possible reasons
for the refusal, the reliability of possible recantations, the recantations in
connection with all the other evidence in the case, and the victim's desires.
Often, an assessment of these factors weighs in favor of dismissing the
charges because the victim's refusal to testify poses insurmountable proof
problems or reflects reasons to question the validity of the initial reports.
This assessment is particularly difficult in domestic violence prosecutions
because the batterer should not, through manipulation of the victim by
threats of further abuse, have de facto control over the State's case.2'
B. Victimless Prosecutions
In recent years, scholars have increased prosecutors' awareness of the
battering power and control dynamic, demonstrating that the batterer's co-
17. Angela Corsilles,No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution ofDomestic Violence Cases: Guarantee
to Action or Dangerous Solution? 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853,857 (1994) ("In manyjurisdictions, prose-
cutors routinely drop domestic violence cases because the victim requests it, refuses to testify, recants, or
fails to appear in court."); James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women.. . Still: Unfulfilled Promises
of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1149, 1163-1164 (1995)
("Prosecutors are hesitant to charge abusers, or they may bring a lesser charge than the offense mandates.
Additionally, prosecutors often are eager to forego prosecution when the victim displays any unwilling-
ness to proceed.").
18. Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimi-
nation ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 66-67 (1996).
19. Truss, supra note 17, at 1163-64.
20. There is some evidence suggesting that a growing number of prosecutors' offices are respond-
ing to domestic violence cases. See Peter R. Dworkin, ConfrontingyourAbuser in Oregon: A New Do-
mestic Violence Hearsay Exception, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 299, 299 (2001); Brooks Holland, Using
Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a
Crack, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 175 (2002).
21. See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and
the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 310 (1993) (concluding that "abusers would become more
violent and aggressive toward the victim when they leamed that she controlled the outcome of the crimi-
nal prosecution.").
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ercion can result in the victim refusing to testify .22 Supporting research casts
doubt on the victim's autonomy in refusing to testify. 23 In addition, the re-
search challenges the prosecution's unwillingness to proceed without the
victim. 24 In several jurisdictions, prosecutors' offices have responded to this
greater recognition of the battering dynamic with victimless domestic vio-
lence prosecutions.25 Prior to the development of victimless prosecutions of
domestic violence cases, the State would not have been able to hold Frank
accountable for his assault on Stephanie if she chose not to testify.
The validity of a victimless prosecution is based on three premises.
First, domestic violence is a societal harm.26 Second, the victim's initial de-
scription of a violent incident is often the most accurate. 27 Third, the State
should give credence to initial reports where those reports are consistent
22. See Christopher Shu-Bin Woo, Familial Violence and the American Criminal Justice System,
20 HAw. L. REV. 375,383 (1998); Thomas L. Kirsch 11, Problems in Domestic Violence. Should Victims
Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution ofTheirAbusers? 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN& L. 383,394
(200 1) ("The defendant often attempts to exert his control over the victim through threats and by pres-
suring the victim not to cooperate with prosecution."); Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground:
Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1315-21 (1993) (showing that the woman's reactions to the battering, including
her testimony or lack thereof, is derived from the controlling aspects of the relationship); Douglas E.
Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told. Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Vio-
lence Victims 'Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, I I COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2002)
(citing studies indicating eighty percent of domestic violence victims refuse to participate in prosecutions
because "[b]atterers put hydraulic pressures on domestic violence victims .... "). Beloof and Shapiro
also argue that the problem of "secondary harm" inflicted on victims as a result of mandatory no-drop
policies is paradoxical because "an individual victim's choice not to prosecute, to lie on the stand, or to
no-show might not be a 'free' choice." This implies that the choice might be dictated by the batterer. Id.
at 35-36; see also Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1996). Beloof& Shapiro, supra, at I ("Batterers
pressure domestic violence victims to recant, which typically results in failure of victims to appear, or
alternatively, in testimony at trial that is less reliable than the victim's initial report of abuse.").
23. The battering dynamic is also often responsible for a domestic violence victim recanting her
initial reports to the police. Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1. Victimless prosecutions can also be
effective in the recantation scenario. See Hanna, supra note 22, at 1851-52. However, even if the victim
is recanting, as long as she testifies in the prosecution's case-in-chief and is subject to cross-
examination, the Crawford decision will not apply. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. For this reason,
this article will focus on the "pure" Crawford issue of the completely absent victim.
24. Cochran, supra note 15, at 100 (arguing that when the State allows the victim to decide
whether to prosecute, "the batterer quickly learns that he can control the decision to prosecute .... ");
Woo, supra note 22, at 383-88; Hanna, supra note 22, at 1883-1900; Meier, supra note 22, at 1305-22;
Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the
Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 608, 615-21 (2000).
25. Hanna, supra note 22, at 1860-65; Allison Frankel, Domestic Disaster, AM LAW., June 1996, at
63-64.
26. Hanna, supra note 22, at 1865.
27. Beloof& Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1.
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with other evidence, regardless of whether the victim is willing to partici-
pate in the prosecution. 28
First, domestic violence harms society even though incidents of do-
mestic violence arise only among partners and families. While the behavior
occurs within a personal relationship, the harm extends beyond the victim
and dramatically affects communities. 29 Each year, domestic violence is
responsible for billions of dollars in property damage and loss, medical
costs, mental healthcare costs, police and fire protection services, and vic-
tims' services.30 Another societal harm arises when a child is raised in a vio-
lent home because that child is more likely to commit criminal acts as an
adult. 31
A second reason for allowing victimless prosecutions is that several
observations suggest that the victim's initial reports are the most accurate.
First, the initial reports tend to be more consistent with all the other evi-
dence than do recantations or later refusals to testify. 32 Most refusals or re-
cantations minimize the defendant's involvement or exaggerate the victim's
share of the blame. 33 The majority of these later versions of domestic vio-
lence incidents are not consistent with the other physical evidence in a
case.34 Second, many victims articulate to police officers and prosecutors
that their abuser threatened increased violence if the victim exposed the bat-
28. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 22, at 1874-75 (describing a case where, despite the fact that the
prosecutor had sufficient evidence to go forward without the victim's testimony, a well-meaning judge
dismissed the case against the victim's husband because of the victim's statement that she wished to
avoid state intervention).
29. Id. at 1889 ("[S]ome researchers have found that violent offenders in the family are more likely
to assault nonfamily"); see also Cochran, supra note 15, at 95-96 ("[P]rosecutors should concentrate on
domestic violence because ignoring the problem leads to future crime, causes great harm to victims and
their children, increases juvenile delinquency, and places great stress on police departments, medical
personnel, and mental health providers.") (citations omitted).
30. Cochran, supra note 15, at 95 n.40 (citing Roberta L. Valente, Domestic Violence and the Law,
in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE: A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK I - 1, 1 -
to 3-3 (Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds., 1996)).
31. Meier, supra note 22, at 1308 ("[S]tudies consistently show what common sense dictates: that
living in homes where domestic violence takes place is profoundly traumatic and destructive for chil-
dren, and that men who beat their female partners are more likely to abuse their children, both violently
and sexually."). See also Cochran, supra note 15, at 95 n.38:
Juveniles who witness violence in the home are 24% more likely to commit sexual assault
crimes, 74% more likely to commit crimes against the person (including assault, robbery, and
theft), 50% more likely to abuse alcohol and drugs, and have a 7% higher likelihood of com-
mitting suicide than children who have not witnessed domestic violence.
32. Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1, 3-4.
33. Hanna, supra note 22, at 1900.
34. id. at 1902 (discussing the importance of police documentation at the scene of a domestic vio-
lence incident: "[S]tories that the victim or the defendant later give to explain away the violence often
contradict the detailed descriptions that the officer gathers.").
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terer's conduct.35 These same victims often disclose to police details about
their relationship with the batterer that are consistent with the dynamics of
power and control.36 The ultimate refusal to testify is consistent with those
earlier articulated patterns of power and control.37
Finally, the notion that the State should give credence to initial reports,
where those reports are consistent with other evidence, supports victimless
prosecution. Recognizing that the impact of domestic violence extends be-
yond a particular intimate relationship, and that the battering dynamic may
be behind a victim's recantation or refusal to testify, the State must pursue
victimless prosecution when the victim's initial reports are consistent with
the other evidence. The victim's refusal to testify or participate in the
State's prosecution does not change the fact that the victim and the commu-
nity have suffered an injury that needs redress.
C. Hearsay Exceptions and Victimless Prosecutions
Victimless prosecution allows a prosecutor to introduce the victim's
credible statements without the victim's testimony in court38 by calling
upon evidence rules governing excited utterances, present sense impres-
sions, and statements to medical personnel.39 These rules are subsections of
Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which delineates exceptions to
the traditional ban on hearsay evidence. 40 Statements falling within the ex-
ception are admitted into evidence based on the assumption that they are
credible41 regardless of who testifies in court about the statements.42
Rule 803(2) defines an excited utterance as a "statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
35. Kirsch, supra note 22, at 393-95. My experience in prosecuting domestic violence cases in-
cludes many similar reports by police officers who have responded to domestic violence incidents.
36. See, e.g., Beloof& Shapiro, supra note 22, at 4-5.
37. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
38. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PENN. L.REV. 117 1,
1190 (2002).
39. Id.; Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective
Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics ofAbusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L.
REV. 115, 139-41 (1991 ) (discussing present sense impression).
40. The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of hearsay evidence. See FED. R. EVID.
801-807. Rule 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testify-
ing at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Rule 802 bars the
admission of hearsay "except as provided by these rules or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
41. Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing-Old Wine in
a New Bottle-Solving the Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80
NEB. L. REV. 891, 893-94 (2001).
42. There are twenty-three categories of hearsay evidence that are admissible whether or not the
declarant testifies. FED. R. EVID. 803.
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excitement caused by the event or condition. 43 Courts generally require the
satisfaction of two conditions prior to admitting a hearsay statement under
the excited utterance exception: First, the proponent of the statement must
demonstrate that the declarant was under the stress of the event when mak-
ing the statement; second, the proponent must demonstrate that there was no
opportunity for the declarant to reflect on the statement before making it.44
As the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence indi-
cate, "the theory of [excited utterances] is simply that circumstances may
produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity for
reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication., 45 A large
majority of states have adopted the excited utterance exception to the hear-
say rule.46 In addition, a large number ofjurisdictions use the excited utter-
ance exception to conduct effective victimless domestic violence prosecu-
tions.47
The present sense impression exception is built upon the same founda-
tional assumptions as the excited utterance exception. 48 Rule 803(1) defines
a present sense impression as "[a] statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter. 4 9 A present sense impression is an
exception to the hearsay rule because the requirement that the statement be
made at, or near, the time of the event largely eliminates possibility of
memory loss or fabrication.50 Although used less frequently than other
exceptions, the present sense impression exception is still an important tool
in domestic violence prosecutions.5'
Another exception to the hearsay rule that is commonly used in do-
mestic violence cases is the exception for statements made to medical per-
43. Id. 803(2).
44. See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE COMMON LAW § 1750, at 202
(James H. Chadboum ed. 1976) ("There must be some occurrence, startling enough to produce this
nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting.") (emphasis in original)
("The utterance must have been before there has been time to continue and misrepresent; i.e., while the
nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance.")
(emphasis in original); see also Holland, supra note 20, at 180-89.
45. ERIC D. GREEN ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 202 (2003 ed.) (citing FED. R. EVID. 803
advisory committee's note). For a history of the excited utterance rule, see Friedman & McCormack,
supra note 38, at 1209-24.
46. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1222.
47. Cochran, supra note 15, at 107-08.
48. Green, supra note 45, at 201-02 ("In considerable measure [present sense impressions and
excited utterances] overlap, though based on somewhat different theories. The most significant practical
difference will lie in the time lapse allowable between event and statement.") (citing FED. R. EVID. 803
advisory committee's note).
49. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
50. Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 907, 907-08 (2001).
51. Asmus, supra note 39, at 139.
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sonnel.52 The exception for statements to medical personnel finds its origins
in common law hearsay exceptions and was codified in Rule 803(4). State-
ments made to medical personnel are admissible if they are "made for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source therefore insofar as reasonably per-
tinent to diagnosis or treatment., 53 The theoretical basis for this exception to
the hearsay rule is the assumption that a person has a strong self-interest in
accurately reporting information to a doctor for diagnosis and treatment.54
The medical statements exception includes statements made to paramedics,
ambulance drivers, nurses, hospital social workers, and doctors.55
In the past several years, the focus on these evidence rules has
changed the way police investigate and document a domestic violence inci-
dent. Today, police in many jurisdictions begin their investigations with the
assumption that the victim will not be present at trial. 56 As a result, officers
take greater care to document the demeanor of the victim at the scene and to
record her exclamations, 57 with an eye toward the admission of the victim's
excited utterances in court.58 In addition, officers now routinely photograph
victims' injuries at the scene, and detectives often revisit the victim to se-
cure additional photographs of developing injuries.59 For victims receiving
medical attention, officers also attempt to secure consent for the release of
medical records60 in an attempt to admit evidence of injuries and statements
made to medical personnel at a subsequent trial. 6 1 Finally, the investigation
of domestic violence incidents routinely involves preserving the recorded
911 calls that summoned police and medical aid62 in order to admit the vic-
52. See infra note 55 and sources cited therein.
53. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
54. John J. Capowski, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health Professionals
Under the Diagnosis or Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L. REV. 353, 360, 364-365 (1999).
55. See id. at 357, 361; Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Admissibility of Statements Made for the
Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment as Hearsay Exception Under Rule 803(4) of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 38 A.L.R. 5th 433 §§ 26-29 (1996).
56. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1187.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Hanna, supra note 22, at 1902. The emphasis on photographs at the scene resulted partially
from the involvement of the Polaroid Company, which provided law enforcement with Polaroid cameras
to document domestic violence injuries. See Cochran, supra note 15, at 104 n.1 13. See also Polar-
oid.com, Family Violence Programs @ Polaroid com, available at http://www.polaroid.com/globalU
printer friendly.jsp?PRODUCT%3C%3Eprd id=845524441760328&FOLDER%3C%3Efolder id=
282574488338439&bmUID=1098499088843&bmLocale=enUS&PRDREG-nulI (last visited Novem-
ber 15, 2004).
60. Hanna, supra note 22, at 1903 (discussing the importance of medical records for prosecutions).
61. See generally Bateman, supra note 55, for a discussion of domestic violence cases using the
hearsay exception for statements to medical personnel.
62. Hanna, supra note 22, at 1903.
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tim's recorded statements as excited utterances and present sense impres-
sions at trial.63 As a result of these increased law enforcement efforts and
hearsay exceptions, it is possible to prosecute batterers for felony assault
without the testimony of the victim.
D. A Typical Victimless Prosecution
Prosecuting Frank for felony assault with a deadly weapon requires
the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt: first, the prosecution must prove that Frank intentionally assaulted
Stephanie with a deadly weapon; second, that the assault with that weapon
resulted in substantial bodily injury to Stephanie.64 To meet its burden, the
prosecutor will have to prove the victim's identity, the degree of injury the
victim suffered, the presence of a weapon, the defendant's mental state, and
the identity of the defendant. 65 Without Stephanie's in-court testimony to
establish the critical elements of both Stephanie's and Frank's identities, the
prosecutor must make use of the excited utterance, present sense impres-
sion, and statements to medical personnel hearsay exceptions.
Using these exceptions, the prosecution will likely be able to establish
Stephanie's identity. 66 First, the early portion of Stephanie's 911 call consti-
tuted an excited utterance because Stephanie was under the stress of the
startling incident and related information pertaining to that incident when
she identified herself to the 911 operator.67 Her statements are likely reliable
because, as the incident had just occurred and continued to unfold while
Stephanie was on the telephone, she had no opportunity to reflect or fabri-
68cate. Furthermore, Stephanie's excited utterances are consistent with the
other evidence in the case: Stephanie identified herself to the hospital and to
her treating physician, and a forensic scientist can establish that the blood
on the knife matched Stephanie's blood drawn at the hospital.
63. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1178.
64. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.021 (2004).
65. The defendant's mental state can be established circumstantially from all the evidence intro-
duced at trial. This is similar to prosecutions in which the victim testifies, and the element is not contin-
gent upon the testimony of the victim or a hearsay exception. Similarly, establishing the knife as a
deadly weapon is not contingent on the testimony of the victim or a hearsay exception and can be estab-
lished through the responding officer. The prosecutor can also establish that Stephanie received substan-
tial bodily harm through the testimony of the officer and the physician. The responding officer can estab-
lish that he observed the injury to Stephanie and transported her to the hospital. He can also authenticate
the photographs of Stephanie's arm. The treating physician can establish that Stephanie's injuries meet
the definition of substantial bodily injury. For these reasons, the discussion will focus on the elements
contingent upon the testimony of the victim or hearsay exceptions.
66. The success of the prosecution will depend upon the prosecutor's ability to establish the neces-
sary foundational requirements for the hearsay exceptions. For the purposes of this discussion, it will be
assumed that these foundations can be satisfied at pretrial hearings.
67. See State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
68. Id. at 302; see also Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 860-61 (Ky. 2004).
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Hearsay exceptions will also help establish the identity of the attacker.
As discussed above, portions of the 911 tape are excited utterances. In one
of the excited utterances, Stephanie identified Frank. The latter portion of
the 91 1 call is both an excited utterance and a present sense impression
69
where Stephanie described what was happening, and the recording captured
sounds of an altercation and Stephanie stating that she had been cut. The
exceptions apply because, on the tape, Stephanie was clearly upset and de-
scribed an event as it was occurring. 70 Again, her opportunity to fabricate
was reduced sufficiently to satisfy the hearsay exception, 7 ' and therefore her
statements that Frank was coming toward her with a knife and then cut her
should be admissible.
Other statements identifying the assailant are admissible as hearsay
exceptions. Stephanie's statement identifying Frank to the responding offi-
cer could qualify as an excited utterance because, when the officer found
Stephanie lying on the bed, she was crying and shaking under the stress of
the incident.72 Frank's identity is also contained twice in the medical re-
cords, once when Stephanie told her doctor that Frank beat and stabbed her,
and again when Stephanie told the hospital social worker that Frank was her
husband of seven years. These statements are admissible under the state-
ments to medical personnel exception because the identity of the assailant is
critical to the medical treatment Stephanie received from her providers; the
attacker's identity can determine a release date and location, the need for
other services, and even the course of treatment, particularly the prevention
of future injury.73 Combining this information with the photographs of
Stephanie and Frank taken from the scene by the responding officer and
booking photographs from Frank's prior conviction involving Stephanie,
the prosecutor should be able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Frank and the assailant are the same individual.
A commitment to victimless prosecution allows the State to hold de-
fendants like Frank accountable for their violent conduct. Focus on the
hearsay exceptions for excited utterances, present sense impressions, and
statements to medical personnel guides the police investigation of the do-
mestic violence incident and the prosecution's presentation of the evidence.
The State is then able to address the individual and societal harm resulting
from the violence, even in situations where the batterer attempts to circum-
vent the criminal justice system by absenting the victim from the justice
69. See State v. Briscoeray, 95 Wn. App. 176, 974 P.2d 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); People v.
Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1998).
70. See Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d at 909.
71. See id., 586 N.W.2d at 915 (Brickley, J., concurring).
72. See Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
73. See State v. Sims, 77 Wash. App. 236, 239, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (1995); United States v. Joe, 8
F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993); see generally Bateman, supra note 55, at §§ 312-37.
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process. Given the societal epidemic that is domestic violence, the State's
efforts to creatively respond through victimless prosecutions are both laud-
able and necessary.
II1. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington dramati-
cally changed the landscape for the admission of out-of-court statements in
all kinds of criminal cases. Prior to Crawford, admission of out-of-court
statements hinged on satisfying the tests established in Ohio v. Roberts.74 In
Roberts, the Court held that an unavailable witness's out-of-court statement
may be admitted so long as it has adequate indicia of reliability by falling
either within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bearing "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 75 The Crawford decision overturned Roberts
and established a rule that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment requires that the defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine out-
76of-court testimonial statements prior to admission. Although the Court
conceded that it could have reached the same decision in Crawford under
Roberts, the Court nevertheless determined that its prior jurisprudence "re-
veal[ed] a fundamental failure on [the Court's] part to interpret the Constitu-
tion in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion. 77
In Crawford, the defendant and his wife, Sylvia, went to the apartment
of Kenneth Lee to confront Lee about his alleged attempted rape of Sylvia. 8
At the apartment, the defendant got into an altercation with Lee. 79 Lee re-
ceived a stab wound to his torso, and the defendant's hand was cut.80 The
police arrested the defendant later that night and interrogated him.81 The
police also interrogated Sylvia after Mirandizing her and tape-recording her
82subsequent statement.
The defendant was charged with assault.8 3 At trial, the prosecution
sought to rebut the defendant's claim of self-defense with testimony from
Sylvia, but Sylvia was unavailable to testify because the defendant asserted
his marital privilege.8 4 Barred from her in-court testimony, the State sought
74. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
75. Id. at 66.
76. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369-70.
77. Id. at 1373.
78. Id. at 1357.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1357-58.
84. In Washington, the marital privilege prevents a husband or wife from testifying for or against
his or her spouse without the spouse's consent. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (2004). The defendant
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to introduce the tape-recording of Sylvia's statement.8 5 The State argued
that Sylvia's statement constituted an admissible statement against interest
86
because she implicated herself in the assault by admitting that she led the
defendant to Lee's apartment. 87 Applying the rule from Roberts, the trial
court found that the tape-recorded statement at issue in Crawforddid not fit
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and admitted the statement on the
alternate ground that the statement contained "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness., 8  The jury convicted the defendant of assault.
8 9
The case went through several stages of appeal. The Washington State
Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the trial
court erred in admitting Sylvia's statement because the statement did not
contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.9" The Washington Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the conviction. 9'
The court found that, because Sylvia's statement was "interlocking" with
the defendant's confession, her statement was reliable and admissible under
Roberts.9 2
The United States Supreme Court elected not to determine whether the
Washington Supreme Court misapplied the Roberts test regarding particular
guarantees of trustworthiness;93 rather, the Court reconsidered whether the
Roberts test was consistent with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. 94 After reviewing the history of the Confrontation Clause and
Supreme Court precedent interpreting that clause, the Court determined that
Roberts needed to be overturned.95
According to Crawford, the historical background of the Confronta-
tion Clause "support[s] two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment., 96 The first inference is that the Confrontation Clause was
primarily directed at the use of testimonial statements as evidence against
the accused,97 and the second inference is that the Clause does not allow
refused to waive the privilege and thus prevented Sylvia from testifying. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at
1357. "
85. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
86. See WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2004).
87. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1358-59.
93. Id. at 1373.
94. Id. at 1357. The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
95. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373.
96. Id. at 1363.
97. Id.
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courts to develop "open-ended exceptions" to the Constitutional confronta-
tion requirement.98
The fact that the Confrontation Clause was primarily directed at testi-
monial statements as evidence compels the conclusion that the commands
of the Confrontation Clause control the admission of out-of-court state-
ments.99 The rules of evidence are of secondary importance and only regu-
late the admission of out-of-court statements once the Confrontation Clause
has been satisfied.'00 Recognizing that not all hearsay statements "impli-
cate[] the Sixth Amendment's core concerns,"'' 1 the Court suggested that
the "primary" concern of the Confrontation Clause was "testimonial hear-
say."' 0 2 The Court did not define "testimonial" for purposes of Confronta-
tion Clause analysis, except to quote the definition of "testimony" from an
1828 dictionary. 10 3 The parties, the amici, and case law all suggested several
variations of the meaning of "testimonial."' 0 4
The petitioner asked the Court to adopt a definition of "testimonial"
that limited testimonial statements to "ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent."' 0 5 Falling within this definition are "affidavits, cus-
todial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably ex-
pect to be used prosecutorially."'' 0 6 This test proposes a definition that
hinges on the declarant's subjective understanding of the way that a state-
ment might be used.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urged the
Court to adopt a definition of "testimonial" statements that would include
"statements... made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use
98. Id. at 1374
99. Id. at 1364.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1365. The Court refused to say that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial
statements. The Court did, however, strongly suggest that position.
103. Id. at 1364 ("[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.") (alterations in original).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (No. 02-
9410)). The United States, as amicus, also asked the Court to adopt this standard. BriefofAmici Curiae
United States at 17, Crawford(No. 02-9410). The United States, however, argued against a categorical
ban on all testimonial statements, suggesting instead that situations exist that justify the admission of
testimonial statements without prior cross-examination if they are particularly reliable. Id. at 21-22. In
addition, the United States did not propose that the definition of testimonial statements also include those
that the declarant believes will be used in trials.
106. BriefofAmici Curiae United States at 21-22, Crawford (No. 02-9410).
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at a later trial.' ' 7 This test would be an objective standard that would exam-
ine the belief of some reasonable person as a witness.
The Court also considered a possible definition for testimonial state-
ments suggested by case law. Specifically, the Court cited to Justice Tho-
mas's concurrence in White v. Illinois, which defined "testimonial" state-
ments as "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions."'10
8
The Court did not endorse any of these three potential definitions. In
fact, the Court refused to define the term "testimonial" at all. It instead de-
termined that a more precise definition of "testimonial" was not necessary
in this case because Sylvia's statement was the product of a police interro-
gation, and police interrogations satisfy any definition of "testimonial.' 10 9
While the Court stated that it was "leav[ing] for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial'," the Court did state
that, at a minimum, "testimonial" applies to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and also to statements
made during police interrogations." 0
The second inference the Court found from the historical record was
that the Confrontation Clause did not "suggest any open-ended exceptions
from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.""' The
Court found that the prior opportunity to cross-examine testimonial state-
ments was not a means of establishing a statement's reliability; rather, prior
cross-examination was "dispositive" of the Confrontation Clause issue." 2
The Court relied on the United States' amicus brief to reach its decision and
acknowledged that the common law recognized several exceptions to the
hearsay rule" 13 at the time the Sixth Amendment was framed in 1791.' 14 The
Court distinguished these exceptions by construing them as largely"cover[ing] statements that by their nature were not testimonial." ' 5 Again,
107. Id. (citing Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys at 3, Crawford (No.
02-9410)).
108. Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
109. Id. at 1374.
110. Id.
I 11. Id. at 1365.
112. Id. at 1366-67.
113. Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 13 n.5, Crawford (No. 02-9410) (discussing recog-
nized exceptions for co-conspirator declarations, dying declarations, regularly kept records, declarations
against interest by deceased persons, statements of fact against penal interest, pedigree and family his-
tory evidence, reputation evidence, and past recollection recorded).
114. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367.
115. Id. The Court recognized that dying declarations did not always fit within the nontestimonial
category. The Court, however, concluded that it did not need to determine whether "testimonial" dying
declarations were an exception to the Confrontation Clause requirement of prior cross-examination be-
fore admission of testimonial out-of-court statements. Id. at 1367 n.6.
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while the Court did not draw a bright-line rule that the Confrontation Clause
applies only to testimonial statements, the language and the reasoning of the
Court strongly suggest just such a bright-line rule.
After concluding that the historical commands of the Confrontation
Clause require a prior opportunity for cross-examination when the proffered
statement is testimonial, the Court found only one case, White v. Illinios," 16
that was inconsistent with the Framers' intent." 7 In White, the Court af-
firmed the admission of statements a child victim made to an investigating
officer even though the victim did not testify at trial. 18 The White Court
found that the statements were spontaneous declarations and admissible
pursuant to Roberts'firmly rooted hearsay exception.119 The Court also de-
termined that the victim's unavailability at trial did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. 20 The Crawford Court distinguished White by
finding that White never reached the issue of whether spontaneous
declarations were testimonial.' 12 While the majority cited an English case
recognizing a hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations, 122 the Court
stated that "it is questionable whether testimonial statements would ever
have been admissible on that ground in 179 1.,,23
Finally, the CrawfordCourt considered the two-part test from Roberts:
The admission of hearsay statements must fall within a firmly rooted hear-
say exception or bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The
Court concluded that the Roberts test is in conflict with the historical under-
standing of the Confrontation Clause. 124 The Court reasoned that the Rob-
erts test was both too broad, because it failed to distinguish between testi-
monial and nontestimonial statements, and too narrow, because it allowed
the admission of testimonial statements on a mere showing of reliability. 25
Construing the Confrontation Clause as a rule of procedure, the Court held
that the Roberts test was in fatal conflict with the Sixth Amendment because
that amendment established the sole procedure for determining the reliabil-
ity of testimonial statements in criminal trials: confrontation by cross-
examination. 126
116. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
117. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8.
118. White, 502 U.S. at 349-51, 358.
119. Id. at 354-57.
120. Id. at 357.
121. The Court also later suggests, although it does not decide, that White v. Illinois is still good
law. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8.
122. Id. at 1368 n.8 (citing Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694)).
123. Id. at 1368 n.8.
124. Id. at 1369.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1370.
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The Court left the question of how to deal with nontestimonial hearsay
to the states: "Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consis-
tent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their devel-
opment of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny alto-
gether."' 127
IV. VICTIMLESS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION
UNDER CRAWFORD
In creating its new rule that the Confrontation Clause requires that the
defense have an opportunity to cross-examine testimonial statements prior
to admission, the Court left numerous questions unresolved. Those ques-
tions include whether the Confrontation Clause requirement only applies to
testimonial statements, and what constitutes a testimonial statement. The
resolution of these questions poses potentially serious problems to victim-
less domestic violence prosecutions. Analyzing Stephanie's case in light of
Crawford makes clear the potential impact Crawford may have on victim-
less domestic violence prosecution. Analysis also highlights that the extent
of Crawford's harm to victimless prosecution turns on the critical questions
left unanswered in Crawford. Because a victimless prosecution of Stepha-
nie's case relies on the excited utterance, present sense impression, and
statements to medical personnel hearsay exceptions, the prosecutor's ability
to proceed in Stephanie's absence will depend wholly upon whether courts
deem these hearsay exceptions nontestimonial statements beyond the reach
of the Confrontation Clause.
In an average criminal proceeding that does not involve domestic vio-
lence, it makes sense to construe statements falling within the excited utter-
ance, present sense impression, and statements-to-medical-personnel hear-
say exceptions as nontestimonial statements. This is because, to qualify as
an excited utterance, for example, the declarant must make the statement
while under the influence of a startling event, the statement must relate to
the startling event, and the declarant must not have had an opportunity to
reflect upon the events or fabricate the story. 128 In many cases, these three
requirements will place the excited utterance outside even the broadest defi-
nition of a testimonial statement because the spontaneous statement, made
by a victim without a chance to reflect, indicates that the victim has no un-
derstanding that the prosecutor will use the statement at a later trial. Simi-
larly, statements to medical personnel will likely be nontestimonial. To
qualify under the exception for statements to medical personnel, the indi-
127. Id. at 1374.
128. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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vidual must make the statement to medical personnel for the purpose of re-
ceiving medical treatment. 129 The individual seeking medical assistance is
doing just that, without intent to provide potential evidence for use at a later
trial. Finally, present sense impressions are contingent upon the declarant
making the statement while describing an event that is presently occur-
ring.130 This temporal requirement places the statement beyond the causal
control of the declarant. With all three of these hearsay exceptions, the de-
clarant makes the statements for purposes unconnected to the production of
incriminating evidence, and therefore the statements would likely qualify as
nontestimonial under any definition of "testimonial" discussed in Crawford.
In the domestic violence context, however, it may not be possible to
make this same statement with confidence. Studies demonstrate that domes-
tic violence is a pattern of behavior repeated over time.'31 Most victims are
assaulted seven times before they involve the police, 32 and they are not able
to fully extricate themselves from the violent relationship until the fifth at-
tempt.133 Domestic violence victims such as Stephanie often have repeated
contact with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. 34 In Stepha-
nie's case, she had firsthand experience and knowledge that her statements
to the 911 operator, the police, and doctors could be used in court because
she had seen them used there before. The impact of Stephanie's firsthand
experience can produce disparate results under the three definitions of"tes-
timonial" discussed in Crawford. Under the definition of "testimonial" pro-
vided by the Crawford petitioner, Stephanie's statements would likely be
subject to the cross-examination requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
Applying the definition proposed by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys in their amicus brief, however, the statements may or
may not be subject to the Confrontation Clause. And a judge applying the
definition in the White case would likely find that the comments satisfy the
Confrontation Clause without cross-examination ever taking place.
Under the subjective definition of "testimonial" proposed by the peti-
tioner in Crawford, Stephanie's personal experience would render "testimo-
nial" her excited utterances to the 911 operator, the police, and her state-
129. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
131. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1196 & n.91 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994)).
132. Id. at 1192 n.77.
133. ELAINE WEISS, SURVIVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VOICES OF WOMEN WHO BROKE FREE 41
(2000) ("Statistics indicate that, on average, battered women return to their batterers five times before
they leave for good.").
134. Twenty percent of domestic violence victims report three or more similar assaults within that
six-month period. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994).
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ments to medical personnel. 35 Stephanie's prior experience with the crimi-
nal justice system would give her a reasonable expectation that her state-
ments could be used at trial. Because the statements are likely testimonial
under this definition, Crawford would require that Frank have a prior op-
portunity to cross-examine Stephanie before her testimony is admitted in
any sort of trial. 136 The result is that cases like Stephanie's would not be
prosecutable without the victim's in-court testimony.
The result under the definition of "testimonial" proposed by the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Attomeys-whether an objective
witness reasonably believes that the statement may be used at trial-
depends on the characteristics the reasonable witness is deemed to have. If
the average domestic violence victim serves as the standard, the statements
will likely be subjected to the cross-examination requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause because of the repetitive nature of domestic violence and
often repeated contact with the criminal justice system. If the objective wit-
ness is determined to be a reasonable person without experience in domestic
violence-and therefore without experience with the criminal justice sys-
tem-the 911 call, the statements to the police, and the statements to medi-
cal personnel might be admissible as nontestimonial statements.
Unlike the other two definitions of "testimonial," all three hearsay ex-
ceptions should avoid invoking the Confrontation Clause under the "testi-
monial" definition in Justice Thomas's opinion in White. Justice Thomas
proposed that the meaning of "testimonial" is limited to "formalized testi-
monial statements" such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or con-
fessions. Stephanie's statements are likely not "formalized testimonial state-
ments" because, while they may be "formalized," they are preserved for
purposes largely unconnected to the production of evidence for use at a later
trial.
The ability of prosecutors to continue employing victimless prosecu-
tions, therefore, is dependent upon which definition of "testimonial" the
United States Supreme Court determines is appropriate.
135. This is the position taken by Friedman & McCormack as to any domestic violence victim
calling 911. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1242.
136. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. It might be possible in some situations to depose the victim
prior to trial. This procedure would provide the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the victim,
and it appears to satisfy the commands of Crawford. Two difficulties exist with this alternative. First, the
most likely time to secure a victim's participation in a deposition is during the first few days after the
traumatic incident. It is seems practically impossible to get the defense ready to do a deposition that
quickly after the incident because that would require production of discovery and time to conduct a
defense investigation. Second, the presence of the defendant poses practical and safety concerns.
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V. CRAWFORD SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO PRESERVE VICTIMLESS
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS
The Supreme Court should adopt a definition of "testimonial" that
does not include excited utterances, present sense impressions, or statements
to medical personnel. Three arguments support this position. First, the very
nature of these statements in the domestic violence context establishes that
they are not testimonial statements, particularly under the narrowest defini-
tion of "testimonial" proposed in Crawford. Second, the historical record
supports the premise that these three hearsay exceptions should not be sub-
jected to the cross-examination requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
Third, sound policy arguments support excluding these three hearsay excep-
tions from a definition of "testimonial," including the policy that the defen-
dant should not profit from his own wrongdoing and the policy that the
Court should not eliminate the tools needed to prosecute otherwise unprose-
cutable offenses.
Excited utterances, present sense impressions, and statements to medi-
cal personnel are not testimonial statements in a domestic violence context,
particularly under the Court's narrow definition of testimonial. The Craw-
ford Court clearly set the rule that the Confrontation Clause bars admission
of testimonial statements absent prior cross-examination and recognized
that much hearsay is not testimonial evidence and does not implicate the
Sixth Amendment. The primary question in determining if a statement is
testimonial is whether the statement bears "resemblance to the civil-law
abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted."'' 37 Thus, further discussion of
what constitutes "testimonial" must be consistent with the primary concern
of the Court: preventing civil-law abuses.
While the Supreme Court did not fully elucidate the perimeters, the
Crawford decision did establish a minimum definition of "testimonial." Ac-
cording to the Court, any definition of "testimonial" necessarily includes
those statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations.1
38
The Court indicated that it was not using "interrogation" in a technical
sense, but that interrogation was satisfied in Crawford because the declarant
made the statement knowingly in response to "structured police question-
ing."'139 While the Court did not define "structured police questioning," the
harm at the heart of the Court's concern about the Confrontation Clause is
the abuse of government agents in using ex parte statements against the ac-
cused. 140 A structured police questioning seems to contain three aspects.
First, the questioner is a government agent who has an investigative or
137. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1365 n.4.
140. See id. at 1364.
2005]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 28:239
prosecutorial function: a police officer, prosecutor,' 4 1 or similar government
official.142 Second, the questioning occurs at the initiation of the police or
prosecutor. 43 Third, the questioning is designed to produce incriminating
evidence.144 At a minimum, therefore, the Confrontation Clause appears to
apply to statements knowingly made to police in response to police-initiated
questions seeking incriminating information.
In the domestic violence context, excited utterances, present sense im-
pressions, and statements to medical personnel would fall outside Craw-
ford's minimum definition of "testimonial." Statements to medical person-
nel are the easiest cases: The victim makes the statement to a doctor, nurse,
or social worker, and not to a police officer or prosecutor. 45 Although these
individuals are investigating, their investigation is medical, not criminal, in
nature.146 Additionally, the questioning is at the initiation of the person
seeking medical assistance rather than at the initiation of law enforcement
personnel. 147 The patient who is also a domestic violence victim can hardly
be accused of exploiting a system over which she has no control.
The fact that the victim, rather than the state, initiates the questioning
makes excited utterances and present sense impressions in domestic vio-
lence situations nontestimonial statements: The primary purpose of the
statement is to summon aid and not to incriminate.1 48 The victim literally
calls out to the state for assistance, and the state does not initiate the contact
141. One district court has interpreted Crawford and found that a statement taken by a prosecutor
and paralegal was testimonial. United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
142. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364-1365.
143. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has construed Crawford and ruled that a woman's ex-
cited utterance to a police officer was not testimonial because the victim's statement was initiated by the
victim, without prompting by police questions. State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22,27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that part of the reason a 911
call is not testimonial is because the victim initiates the call).
144. The Colorado Court of Appeals found that, under Crawford, a police interview with a child
abuse victim was a testimonial statement because it was initiated and conducted by police. People v.
Vigil, No. 02CA0833, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024, at *5-6 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004).
145. A California Court of Appeals has ruled that a victim's statement to her doctor was not testi-
monial after Crawford. People v. Hunter, No. 163182, 2004 WL 1282842, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 9,
2004). The fact that a person might visit the emergency room of a public hospital should not change this
analysis. While doctors in state hospitals are state agents, they do not serve as prosecutors.
146. See Heard v. State, No. 2002-CA-002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163, at * 1 (Ky. Ct. App. June
18, 2004) (holding that the victim's statements to the doctor were properly admitted).
147. See State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 289-90 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004) (a child's statement to a
doctor was not testimonial because the victim's family brought her to the emergency room to seek treat-
ment, and there was no indication that the purpose of the visit was to formulate evidence for trial); State
v. Castilla, No. 51679-5-1, slip op. at 4 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2004) (statements to a nurse were not
testimonial because the statements were not "elicited by a government official and were not given with
an eye toward trial.").
148. See Moscal, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80 (a 911 phone call is not testimonial because it is initiated
by the victim, who desires to be rescued, and the 911 call is part of the actual criminal incident rather
than part of the prosecution that follows).
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to produce incriminating information. 149 The fact that the state incidentally
collects incriminating evidence should not convert a statement made for the
purposes of receiving assistance into a testimonial statement. 150 If that were
the case, the Supreme Court's testimonial discussion would have been sig-
nificantly different: The Court would have focused not on whether the
statement was testimonial, but rather on whether it was incriminating.
In a recent pre-Crawford article,' 5' commentators Richard Friedman
and Bridget McCormack argue that the use of 911 calls as evidence, par-
ticularly in domestic violence cases, violates the Confrontation Clause. The
authors propose a definition of "testimonial" similar to the definition prof-
fered by petitioners in Crawford: A statement is testimonial if a reasonable
person knows the statement will be used in the investigation or prosecution
of a crime.'5 2 Friedman and McCormack assert that victims and batterers
engage in a "race" to the telephone, and the authors argue that this supports
the notion that 911 callers are conscious that their call will be used as evi-
dence. 153 In their view, the domestic violence victim's 911 call is testimo-
nial because the victim is aware that 911 calls may be used in court.' 54
Friedman and McCormack argue that these 911 calls should not be admissi-
ble without cross-examination. 55 The authors correctly identify the diffi-
culty that domestic violence cases pose in the debate over what constitutes a
testimonial statement: Domestic violence victims often have experience
with the criminal justice system and specific knowledge that their state-
ments to 911, officers, and doctors may be admissible. 56 The authors' posi-
tion that 911 calls should not be admissible is less convincing.
Arguments supporting the position that 911 calls should never be ad-
missible in domestic violence cases distort the legal context. Authors taking
this position often give the impression that every 911 call is necessarily ad-
149. See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945,950,952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that the victim's
tale of her batterer's assault was a valid excited utterance and not testimonial because the statement was
not in response to police interrogation, but informal questioning).
150. In fact, courts in New York and Indiana have acknowledged that the very nature of an excited
utterance precludes it from being testimonial. See People v. Isaac, No. 23398/02, 2004 WL 1389219, at
*4 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. June 16, 2004) (stating that 911 calls are not equivalent to testimonial statements, "not
because they fall within a hearsay exception, but because the characteristics which bring them within this
particular hearsay exception negate the characteristics which would be required to make them 'testimo-
nial."'); see also Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that, although a
victim gives a statement to a police officer, the fact that the statement was an excited utterance "place[s]
it outside the realm of testimonial statements."); see also Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952.
151. See generally Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38.
152. Id. at 1240-41.
153. Id. at 1193-94.
154. Id. at 1240-44.
155. Id. at 1242-43.
156. Id. at 1196.
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missible. 157 For example, Friedman and McCormack's use of the term "dial-
in testimony" suggests that there is a direct line from the 911 operator to
courtroom. 158 In reality, several layers of discretion stand between a 911
caller and admission of that 911 call into evidence at trial: The police, the
prosecutor, and the judge must all make decisions regarding the 911 call.
Most importantly, the court must determine that the call constitutes an ex-
cited utterance or present sense impression.' 59 The issue, therefore, is not
whether the evidence is a 911 call, but whether the particular call constitutes
an excited utterance.
Friedman and McCormack's article also largely ignores the domestic
violence context. They build their case against 911 calls by highlighting the"race to the phone."' 160 The use of the phrase "race to the phone" distorts the
reality of the situation. A race calls to mind a competition between equals
with similar objectives, which misconstrues the intent of the victim and di-
vorces the situation from the dynamics of power and control within the rela-
tionship.16' The authors' case studies seem to actually support the opposite
conclusion, that the batterer and the victim often have different agendas:
The batterer seeks to achieve an advantage within a mandatory arrest
framework, and the victim seeks assistance. 162 Friedman and McCormack's
discussion is disconnected from the critical issue of whether the statement is
an excited utterance or a present sense impression.' 63
Finally, Friedman and McCormack's definition of "testimonial"
seems, at turns, cynical and simplistic. On their terms, no domestic violence
victim could ever have a truly excited utterance because she holds prior
knowledge of the ability to use a statement in investigation or prosecu-
tion. 164 It is cynical to suggest that this knowledge so permeates an individ-
ual's consciousness that she is unable to make a reliable, spontaneous
statement. One would also have to extend this assumption of knowledge to
defense attorneys, prosecutors, practicing attorneys with an understanding
of the rules of evidence, police officers, domestic violence advocates, and
judges, because they too have prior knowledge that their 911 statements
may be used in a future prosecution. In the context of domestic violence, the
157. See e.g.. id. at 1198 n.98 ("But the prosecutor could have proved the case against the wife
with his 911 call and follow-up statements to the police."). This statement leaves out the entire discus-
sion of whether the statements would even meet the hearsay exceptions.
158. Id. at 1171 ("[N]ow a new way is developing for witnesses for the prosecution to testify: Call
911.").
159. The trial court controls the admission of evidence.
160. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1197.
161. Many states have recognized the reality of the situation and criminalized efforts to interfere
with a 911 call. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.150(l)(b) (2004).
162. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1197-98 n.97.
163. See supra note 150.
164. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 38, at 1242.
[Vol, 28:239
Crawford: End of Victimless Prosecution
authors' arguments are simplistic. Given the well-documented fact that vic-
tims often work against their supposed self-interest, 65 it is unlikely that the
primary reason victims call for help is to generate incriminating evidence
rather than to stop the current violence.
A second reason to interpret Crawfordto preserve victimless prosecu-
tions is that the historical record supports the proposition that testimonial
statements should not include excited utterances, present sense impressions,
and statements to medical personnel. The Crawford Court recognized that
exceptions to the hearsay rules, 166 including a precursor to the exception for
excited utterances and present sense impressions, existed before the Framers
wrote the Confrontation Clause. 167 Since these exceptions existed at the
framing of the Sixth Amendment, the Framers likely did not intend these to
fall within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause. As Wigmore explained,
"[t]here were a number of well-established [exceptions] at the time of the
earliest constitutions, and others might be expected to be developed in the
future."' 168 The Crawford Court read the historical record as treating the
statements covered by these exceptions as nontestimonial. 169
Finally, sound social and legal policy supports limiting Crawlord in
the domestic violence context. The Court's decision in Crawford estab-
lished a rule of procedure that requires testimonial statements to be sub-
jected to cross-examination prior to admission. 70 If the Court construes
statements to medical personnel, present sense impressions on 911 tapes,
and excited utterances in the domestic violence context to be testimonial
statements, the defendant will profit from his own misdeeds because the
domestic violence victim is generally absent from trial due to the defen-
dant's action or threatened action.' 7' The defendant, therefore, can profit by
165. See Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 20-21 (2004).
From one perspective, the fact that victims remain in violent relationships, recant their testimony, or
refuse to testify when the State is prosecuting can be seen as the victims working against their self-
interest.
166. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367.
167. Id. at 1368 n.8.
168.3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923). While the Crawford Court cited to Wigmore, the
decision itself might call into question the continued validity of section 1397. Some scholars blame
Wigmore (and specifically section 1397) for the idea that the right of cross-examination was merely an
evidentiary rule, essentially equivalent to the hearsay rule. Since Crawford severs the ties between the
right to confrontation and the rules of evidence, Wigmore's view of the Confrontation Clause may no
longer be trustworthy. For more discussion of Wigmore and the Confrontation Clause see Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Re-
straint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 572 (1992).
169. Crawford 124 S. Ct. at 1367.
170. Id. at 1370, 1374.
171. See Corsilles, supra note 17, at 870-71 n. 127 ("Although not all batterers engage in escalated
violence during the pendency of prosecution, as many as half threaten retaliatory violence, and at least
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the Confrontation Clause when he creates the situation in which the rule
would apply to his case in the first instance. 7 2 This profit actually creates a
perverse incentive for the batterer to exert pressure to absent the victim, and
the application of the Confrontation Clause to domestic violence situations
reinforces the very same domestic violence dynamics that the State attempts
to challenge through the prosecution.173
Additionally, it is bad policy to remove a potent avenue to address the
ills of domestic violence. Construing excited utterances, present sense im-
pressions, and statements to medical personnel as testimonial statements
eliminates the hearsay exceptions most at issue in domestic violence cases.
Victimless domestic violence prosecutions allow the State to proceed when
the defendant has been so successful in his battering that the victim is un-
able to assist the State. 174 Unlike the difficulties with child sexual assault
prosecutions that are dependent on highly suggestible victims, 175 no re-
search indicates that domestic violence victims fail to provide accurate and
reliable information to 911 operators or treating doctors, or that spontaneous
30% of batterers may inflict further assaults during the predisposition phase ofprosecution.") (emphasis
added).
172. One example of how a broad definition of"testimonial" helps a batterer elude conviction is
found in the recent case of People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 WL 1470795, at * I (Cal. Ct. App. June
30,2004). In Kilday, two police officers responded to a domestic violence call. At the scene, the victim
was visibly upset and frightened. As an initial investigation, the police officers questioned the victim
about what happened. The victim told the officers that the defendant cut her with glass, burned her legs,
and hurt her shoulder and head. In ruling that these statements to the investigative officers were testimo-
nial, the California appellate court held that even if statements are not in response to a police interroga-
tion, the statements are testimonial because they are part of a police investigation aimed at obtaining
testimonial evidence. The victim in this case did not testify at trial, likely because of her fear of the de-
fendant. Id. at *6 n.8. With the court adopting a liberal definition of "testimonial" and the victim un-
available to testify at trial, the statements that the victim made to the police after the incident were ex-
cluded, and the prosecution was left with little or no case against the batterer.
173. In Crawford, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the Confrontation Clause that
might be applicable in this context, namely forfeiture by wrongdoing. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. For
detailed discussions of this exception, see James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who
Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459 (2003); Birdsong, supra note 41; Joan Comparet-Cassani,
Balancing the Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses Versus a Defendant's Right of Confrontation: The
Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1165 (2002).
174. See Cochran, supra note 15, at 90, 102-04 (explaining that a committee in the Texas House of
Representatives concluded that the unequal power structures in violent marriages precluded many vic-
tims from testifying about the abuse. This unequal power structure and loss of the victim's testimony
necessitates using the excited utterance, photographs of the crime scene, and statements made for medi-
cal purposes for the prosecution to proceed with charges.) (citing House Comm. on Criminal Jurispru-
dence, Bill Analysis, H.B. 25, 74th Leg., (Tex. 1995)).
175. Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial
Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927, 933 (1993) ("Social science evidence of chil-
dren's suggestibility indicates that persistent pretrial interrogation of child witnesses can impair the
search for truth in litigation. Indeed, the case can be made that the pretrial process not only refines, but
actually manufactures children's accusations, however unwittingly.").
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statements stemming from the violent incident are unreliable. On the con-
trary, research and experience strongly suggest that abused women are more
credible when they are speaking to 911 or to their doctors as well as during
the stress of the violent incident than they are later,177 when they have time
to reflect on the dangerousness of their situations 78 and the additional risk
of harm to themselves that would result from participation in the prosecu-
tion. 179 Rather than rewarding battering behavior, the Court should carefully
construe the definition of "testimonial" to preserve the ability of prosecutors
to combat the evils of domestic violence.
V. CONCLUSION
The victimless domestic violence prosecution is a creative, resource-
ful, and effective response to the patterns established by the defendant who
then batters his partner. Use of the hearsay exceptions grew out of the in-
176. See Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1.
177. Id. at 19-21.
By the time testimony is given, the victim will likely have been subject to threats or coercion
by the assailant. Due to the pressure on the victim to recant, testimony given on the witness
stand months later by the domestic violence victim will not have the same evidentiary value,
and cannot substitute for the out of court statement.... [T]he initial out of court statement of
a domestic violence victim in a domestic violence case is likely to be the most reliable state-
ment obtainable[.]
ld.; see also Hanna, supra note 22, at 1901.
178. One author describes several reasons why a cooperative victim may become uncooperative:
Most domestic violence victims have been frequently threatened by the batterer and under-
stand that police departments are often not equipped to protect them against a truly obsessed
defendant. If the victim has children, she may fear that her cooperation in the prosecution
may result in the loss of her children through kidnapping, violence, or a custody battle. The
victim may also fear that the defendant will carry out his threats to harm or kill her family
members, friends and/or pets.
Victims of domestic violence may refuse to cooperate in their batterer's prosecution for
economic reasons. "When a battered woman leaves her abuser, there is a 50% chance that her
standard of living will drop below the poverty line." [And] it is a myth to think that being
"cut off" is the only form of economic harm a batterer can impose on his victim. For exam-
ple, a batterer will often harass a victim at her place of work, until her employer terminates
her from her position. He may refuse to pay his portion of child support. He may make false
reports of fraud to the Welfare Department to create obstacles to her lawful receipt of public
assistance. He may destroy her property, including her home and car. He may harass and an-
noy her neighbors, until her landlord terminates her rental agreement. He may threaten the
children's caregiver, until the caregiver refuses to care for the children. Victims of domestic
violence often experience these economic threats and harms and know that there is rarely any
practical legal recourse. Thus, a victim's decision not to cooperate in her batterer's prosecu-
tion may simply be a rational economic choice.
Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims ofDo-
mestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 368-69 (1996) (internal footnotes omitted); see also
Beloof& Shapiro, supra note 22.
179. See Corsilles, supra note 17; Raeder, supra note 11, at 794 (noting that the expert on domestic
violence in the O.J. Simpson murder trial, Dr. Dutton, estimated that the risk of spousal homicide in-
creases by a factor of six on separation).
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ability to prosecute serious offenses due to the victim's unavailability and
society's increased recognition of the domestic violence battering dynamic,
including the defendant's role in the victim's refusal to testify. Without the
hearsay exception tools, prosecutors' offices across the country will be
powerless to address a significant portion of domestic violence crimes;
without these tools, domestic violence will return to a private realm beyond
the reach of the state. Using victimless prosecutions, society has made in-
roads against domestic violence. Eliminating the ability to proceed without
the victim will reverse these societal gains. Batterers will quickly realize the
state's inability to proceed in millions of crimes against women, even when
women actively seek the assistance of law enforcement. Courts, therefore,
must construe Crawford in such a way that adopts a narrow definition of
"testimonial" that does not preclude the use of excited utterances, present
sense impressions, and statements to medical personnel in domestic vio-
lence cases. In this way, the strength of victimless prosecutions will be pre-
served.
